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IV—THE APPREHENSION OF FEELING.
BY HELEN WODEHOUSE.
1. CAN feeling be known ?—the word feeling being used as a
short expression for pleasure-pain and activity-consciousness
and the whole subjective side of experience.
About the knowledge of present feeling in the ordinary
sense I have nothing new to say. I have never so far seen
sufficient reason to depart from the doctrine taught by Dr.
Ward, that feeling and activity-consciousness are elements in
experience, but that while they are present we cannot know
them. Dr. Stout maintains the first part of this doctrine in
his essay in The British Journal of Psychology, vol. ii., but in his
address to the Aristotelian Society, 1905-1906, he opposes the
second part Whether the knowledge of present activity which
he claims in the second paper is or is not the same as the
activity-consciousness which he maintains in the first, I am
not sure. If it is the same, my difficulty is this : activity-
consciousness is characterised by not being knowledge in
the ordinary sense, and I cannot see its claim to be called
knowledge at alL If on the other hand the two are not
the same, I cannot see reason enough for believing in the
knowledge. When we desire a thing, says Dr. Stout, we
know it as desired, and therefore know our desire. But uhe
primary act, it seems to me, is simply to know-and-desire,
to desire the known. To know that we desire is the act of
reflexion that follows. It is possible that there is only a
matter of words between us; and I am always uncomfortable
when I differ from Dr. Stout I wait to be converted.
2. I hold then that present feeling is not in the ordinary
meaning known. Nevertheless I consider that in another
sense it can be partly known, even while it still exists.
What this knowledge is will become clear in the course
of the examination of the second part of our subject, the
apprehension of past feeling. If we take a first general
glance at this, the arguments which strike us seem to be
two.
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524 HELEN WODEHOUSE :
(a) At first sight we are, I think, inclined to say that we
can remember our feelings. I remember a day at school
when I was extremely happy, and I certainly seem to re-
member the happiness. " Do you not," it may be said, " per-
haps remember the cause, and the attendant cognitions, and
so infer, not remember, that you were happy ? ' The cause
was and is entirely unknown to me ; the mood came unex-
plained. The attendant circumstances were London streets,
a fresh wind, and grey roofs shining in grey light after rain.
There were organic sensations, I suppose, but I cannot say
that I remember them. The happiness certainly seems at first
sight not to be inferred but to be directly remembered.
Against this argument that we can remember feelings two
different objections have been brought One is : " This is not
a remembrance, a presentation of feeling; it is a revival.
You put yourself in the old position, and are again glad."
The other is : " You do not remember the happiness; you
only remember that you were happy ". Both these must be
returned to later on.
(/3) The second argument is a logical deduction from the
fact of our present investigation. " Here are we examining,
judging, and investigating feeling. How can it be said that
we do not know it ? If we judge, we must at least appre-
hend. Again, we can desire feelings and expect them, and
be pleased or vexed with ourselves for having them. In all
these cases, is not feeling the object of our apprehension ? "
The objection brought against this argument is : " This is
not knowing, but knowing about. You do not apprehend
your feelings, but only that you did or will feel."
ThiB answer evidently has the same sort of purport as the
former statement that ' we do not remember happiness, but
only remember that we were happy '. It is certainly very
difficult sometimes to know what exactly we mean when we
say that we remember. It will be wisest then to examine in
the next place a few of the different things that remembering
may mean. Or rather, not to tie ourselves to words, we will
examine what we can do with a past process.
3. The simplest thing to do with a past process is to repeat
it. I can submit myself again to a sensation; can go again
through the arguments for my beliefs; can repeat to myself
the poem which I learnt. We certainly use the word " re-
member " with this meaning sometimes. "We say not only,
" Do you remember that poem?" meaning," Can you repeat
it ? " but, in the same sense, " Can you remember it ? " This
of couree is the simplest thing to do with feeling. I can
easily be happy again at the renewed thought of a piece of
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THE APPREHENSION OF FEELING. 525
good fortune; can revive my anger at an old injury. It
is possible that sometimes when we speak of remembering
feeling we mean only this. " Feeling-memory" in the sense
of habit of feeling comes under this account. A cat of my
acquaintance, having once caught his leg in a watch-chain
and swung by it in the air, swore softly with a true revival
of feeling whenever he met the watch-chain afterwards.
4. Next, there is another thing we can do with a past pro-
cess. We can, without really repeating it, play at repeating
it. When I cannot look at the l>lue sky, I may image it.
Instead of playing on the violin the tune I played just now,
I may go over it in my head. When I have ceased to be-
lieve in the premises of my old faith, I may still go over the
arguments that followed. Without reviving my belief, I may
still recall it. Where I no longer know, I may still assume.
I may project myself back into the old place.1
One of the most interesting chapters in recent psychology
is that which works out the similar'process on the side of
feeling. As I recall my sight of past snows, my belief in
a lost leader, so can I recall the feelings which accompanied
them, and in all these cases to recall is not to revive. As
I can act through to myself a scene of youth in which I
heard that I had failed in an examination, so can I call
up the dull misery of the hour—can feel it in play as I hear
the announcement in play. Since I know that this failure,
by affecting my plans, really laid the foundation of future
success, I am far from being miserable about it now. In
the same way I can share every sorrow of a hero of tragedy
in the course of a uniformly pleasant evening.
This, I think, is very often what we mean when we speak
of remembering feelings; and the failure to recognise the
existence of these fancy-feelings has been the source of many
of our difficulties of theory. For most people this way of
remembering is easy enough—easier probably than imaging
past organic sensations. We have only been induced to
believe that we cannot recall feeling because we have dis-
believed a priori in a recall distinct from revival. Whenever
we succeeded in the easy task of play-feeling we have thought
that we must be having the real feelings again.2
1
 Cf. Prof. Alexander in Proc. ArUtottlian Soe., 1908-1909 : "Suppose
I am remembering an event as happening to myself. . . . The past
object is before my mind, but it is not present. But my past self is
present It is an extension backwards of myself. . . . We find just
what we should expect to find if we understood mental events to be mere
directions of consciousness. A past direction is a present consciousness.''
*Cf. Prof. Alexander, Proe. Aristotelian Soc., 1908-1909, pp. 35, 36 :
"Before it can be established that we have emotional or feeling memory
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526 HELEN W0DEH0U8E :
5. The question is, have we here a case of apprehending
past feeling ? When I first met with this chapter of
psychology I thought we had. Now t a r n fairly sure that
we have not. \
German descriptions are obscure on this\point by reason
of their use of the same word, Vor&tMung, for image and for
presentation. Hofler,1 taking his account of sfancy-feelings
from an article of Witasek's, makes no distinction between
this sense of having feelings vorgestellt and the sense'in which
the psychologist has processes vorgestdlt when he examines
them as objects. Witasek * himself seems to take the fancy-
feelings as presented. But Meinong,* still referring to
Witasek, takes them as analogous on the feeling side to as-
sumptions on the knowledge side, and therefore as being
still of the nature of feeling, and not objects of knowledge.
In Meinong's account, that is, they are not presentations
but true feeling-images.
I have little doubt myself that Meinong's treatment is
right. The SoheingefUhlt are still feelings, though not
" actual " feelings, not feelings-in-earnest, just as assumptions
are still cognitive though they are not real beliefs. We are
not here apprehending our past feelings. We are only play-
ing at feeling them over again.
6. So far as we have gone, Dr. Ward's objection to all pre-
sentation of feeling still holds.4 It is true that what is not
originally presentation cannot be made presentation by being
repeated, in earnest or in play. The question is, then, whether
we can do anything with a past process except do it again. Is
there such a thing as contemplation apart from, or over and
above, repetition ? We shall find that our attempt to an-
swer this question involves the answer to the second of the
two objections from which we started, in that it obliges us
to think out the connexion between knowing and knowing-
about.
we must show that we are not merely remembering the bodily accompani-
ments, or the attendant circumstances, or the provoking object, of a
past emotion, and so reviving that emotion. . . . We feel our present
self extending backwards to the remembered event, and the pleasureable
tinge in this experience is the idc%l pleasure. It is quite distinguish-
able from the jueasure that we feel in the same object when actually
present. . . . It is a pleasure ideally present, referred to the past of
myself, wbioh past is called up by the memory of the external conditions
under which it occurred."
1
 Psychology, pp. 209, 210.
*Ze\Lf. Pryeh., 1901: " Zur psychologischen Analyse der asthetischen
Rinf iihlung ".
* " liber Annahmen."
4
 Eney. Brit, first article on "Psychology," p. 44 6.
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THE APPBBHENSIOK OF FEEIJKG. 527
7. Soppose that I see, on the dress of a saint in a stained-
glass window, a border of a peculiar shade of rose. I can, first,
repeat this seeing by going to the church again. Secondly,
without going to the church, I may visualise the tint.
Thirdly, I may do more. I may remark to myself on the
unusual nature of the colour. I may reflect that it occurred
only in one other window of the church's magnificent series
of ancient glass, and that I do not remember having seen
it in any other church. I may wonder what particular pro-
cess was used to produce it; may judge it to be a shade or
two paler than a La France rose; may notice its rare har-
mony with the other colours in the window, and think it
gives a tenderness and unexpected delicacy to the whole
picture which could not be otherwise attained. In all these
judgments I am apprehending that piece of colour which is
their subject; and in all of them I am doing something more
than merely repeat the process in which I apprehended it
before.
Suppose that I have been taught in childhood a certain
account of the history of this saint I may go over it now in
undisturbed faith. Or, if faith has disappeared, I may still
go over the story as a story, without altering a detail.
Thirdly, I may compare it with the histories of other saints,
Christian and heathen. I may judge it to be beautiful, to be
useful in education, to be fit to be taught as a parable if not
as literal truth. 1 may form theories as to the way in which
it arose. In all these thoughts I am apprehending in a new
way the story which I used to believe and may still assume.
This new apprehension is neither belief in the story nor as-
sumption of it; but it is real apprehension nevertheless.
Finally, take my childhood's feeling towards this saint If
my faith has been retained, I may revive them now, or some-
thing near them; or by self-suggestion, even if my faith has
been shaken, I may manage to repeat them. If I prefer it, I
may without any illusion still play at taking the old place,
still feel my old devotion in image though not in actuality.
Thirdly, I may use contemplation other than repetition. I
may estimate the value of these feelings in moral and re-
ligious development I may note the history of their growth
and decline, the way in which surroundings and interests
helped them or hindered. I may see what they rested on ;
^remember 'the commonness of such feelings in the young. In
all these judgments I apprehend their subject. In knowing
these things I know feeling. This is the true apprehension
of past feeling. But further commentary is needed.
8. In examining this whole question of the knowledge of
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528 HELEN WODEHOUSE:
feeling, I was troubled by the apparent self-contradictcriness
of the statement—" Feeling cannot be apprehended ". How,
I asked, could one make a judgment without apprehending
its subject? how could one think about a thing without
thinking of it ? The last section has shown that I still main-
tain this objection. But I think now that the original state-
ment, if carefully expressed, may be maintained as well. To
examine this, let us as before leave the controversial ground
of feeling and deal first with objects cognised.
a. Take first my tint of rose-colourJ I can apprehend it
in image and sensation. I can also apprehend it in thought,
—as produced in the fifteenth century, as similar to the La
France roses outside, yet not like them destined to fade; as
connected with certain ether-vibrations; as a glory to the
church. All this is real apprehension. I know the tint,
not know about it. Yet it remains true that a blind man
could be taught all this knowledge and still lack that know-
ledge which I had by sense. Or, to take an example which
is much better because it is less likely to lead to irrelevant
paths,—if I were not able to visualise colour I could still
have in absence all this apprehension of thought, could know
in absence all the colour's history and its gloriousness. But
the rose-ness of it I could get only by going to the church
again.
Sense and thought, that is, know the same object, but
what sense sees in it thought cannot see. Green was wrong
in holding that perfectly adequate conception needs no sen-
sation to fill it up.1 Thought knows the object [I insist upon
this] but not in its sensational capacity. If the eye of sense
is considered as occupying the blind spot in the eye of thought,
then we may say picturesquely that thought, in knowing
our object, knows about that element in it which sense knowa
Of course it is most important to remember the other side ;
that sense is blind to what thought sees, which is by far
the greater part of what is in the object. But that does not
affect us just here.
b. So far the facts are clear enough. They are rather
harder to see and fix when we come to the next level.
Take a statement in that history of the saint which I for-
merly believed. I can repeat my belief in it, or I can play at
repeating and assume it. Thirdly, in contemplation other
1
 It will be just the same if I take, e.g., a movement sensation, which
in popular language " only exists at the uioment of sensing ". I have not
taken trouble to use example* of this sort, because their peculiarity seems
to make no difference to my line of argument.
3
 Works, ii., 190.
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THE APPEEHENSION OF FEELING. 529
than repeating I can apprehend its connexions, history,
value, and the rest. This is still apprehension; it is acquain-
tance, immediate knowledge. I am said to be thinking about
the statement, but really I am thinking it about. I am pulling
it about, making it exhibit itself, putting it in new fields of
thought to govern them, making it grow.
I am still apprehending the statement. But so far as I
am not repeating my original apprehension, so far as I am
not apprehending just that in it which I apprehended before.
The exhibition in new fields is new. I still know the object,
but it-in-its-original-aspect I know-about.
9. With regard to both my instances, the colour in the
glass and the history of the saint, what I am most afraid of
is that emphasis may be laid on the second part of the last
sentence to the overlooking of the first. I insist with all
possible earnestness that if I know about I know. If I can-
not visualise the appearance of the rose-coloured border, I
can still know its position and value and uncommonness, its
purpose and its history. I know that its tint is like that of
a rose, different from a hyacinth, deeper than the sunset;
unexpected, beautiful. My knowledge is not about it but of
it. I know nearly all that is in it, that makes it; I know it.
A man with the window in front of him, but with a concus-
sion of the brain confining him to bare perceiving, would
know the border too, but know less of it, less in it. Each of
us knows it, and each knows-about that in it which the other
knows. We must absolutely reject the plan of giving
the titles of knowledge and acquaintance to sense-knowledge
alone, and denying it to any apprehension in which only the
sense-element is invisible.
It may be said that this is only a matter of words, that if
we abstract and limit further, and take "the content of my
sensation" for our "object," we shall have to say simply
that thought knows about it without knowing it. No, for
in this very judgment the " sense-content" has become an
•object of thought. And a thousand other judgments press in ;
the sense-content has a history, a place and date in my
mental life, and relations to other contents; we can form
theories as to its success in revealing the object; theories as
to its difference from the sense-content of a colour-blind
person looking at the window. The "object of sense" has
indeed blossomed and swelled beyond the bounds of sense.
No slip of reality can be cut so fine that it will not grow in
the thought-field. No object can be made so microscopically
small that it will not govern an infinite range of thought.
The difficulty lies indeed in explaining what it is that
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580 HELEN WODEHOU8E :
thought is debarred from. Did I say that the rose-ness was
invisible to it ? In that very judgment the rose-ness is ap-
prehended. Fortunately explanation is helped by the fact
that nearly every one admits that there is a debarring, and
knows the sort of exhibition which the object, rose-colour,
gives in sense alone. I need only lay full emphasis on the
other side, insisting that rose-colour is known not only in
sense but m thought.
10. That which sense sees in an object thought cannot
see; but is a mistake to explain this as the result of any
character of uniqueness or peculiar immediacy which sense
may possess. It is simply a special case of the obvious rule
that " so far as I am not repeating my original apprehension,
so far I am not apprehending just that aspect of the object
which I apprehended before ". The exhibition in new fields,
must be new. If I ask a different question, the object must
give a different answer. Take a level where sense does not
enter at all, and let our object be "the bishop who re-
modelled Exeter Cathedral, completing the change from the
Norman to the Decorated style ". This is my first introduc-
tion to Bishop Grandisson, but I may deepen and enlarge
my acquaintance with him afterwards. So far as I do not
repeat my first apprehension of him, so far I do not know
him in the original way. It is possible that I may cease to-
be able to recall that first knowledge. Yet I shall hardly be
said to have ceased to know GrandiSBon because I am obliged
to ask, " What was it exactly that he had to do with the
Cathedral ? " Or it may be that my first introduction was to-
" a Bishop of Exeter called Grandisson". Returning after
some years, I may say, " I know all about the bishop who re-
modelled the Cathedral,but I cannot remember for the moment
who he was"—meaning only, " I have forgotten his name ".
It will scarcely be denied here that the so-called knowing-about
is a better knowing than the original apprehension, but the
original is omitted. Once more, let our object be the content
of the assertion, " St. Dorothy sent flowers from heaven to
the youth who loved her ". This exhibition of the object is
no more the end of it than the guide-book or passport de-
scription is the end of a man. I may think it about; may
estimate the place of this incident in the story, its bearing
on what precedes and follows, its value for the mediaBval or
modern story-teller and poet, or for the child who hears it in
a Catholic school; I may think of its probable origin and
its possible use as an allegory. In all this I apprehend the
incident, but not just as I apprehended it to begin with.
11. The case of feeling is now probably clear enough. I
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THE APPREHENSION OF FEELING. 531
can apprehend it, and I do so whenever I make a judgment
about it. But, as with sensation and belief, my apprehension
does not give me just that element, or aspect, or exhibition
of it which I had before. So far as I do not repeat a process,
so far I do not get just what that process gave. Everything—
everything in the widest and vaguest sense—is a law-complex
which works inexhaustibly, and works differently in every
field. Thought cannot exhaust what enters in sense, but
neither can sense exhaust it; and feeling cannot exhaust
feeling. My conclusion is, then, that feeling and activity-
consciousness are in just the same position with regard to
after-apprehension as are the presented elements in conscious-
ness. For each we may use either repetition, or play-
repetition, or apprehension-other-than-repetition. So far as
we do not repeat, so far we do not get the same exhibition
of the thing as we got before.
The sense in which I suggested that we might know
present feeling will now be clear also. We know it when,
and only when, our present act is to think of our present
feeling. In that sense I know it while I write this passage.
But in an ordinary act of cognition we cannot know present
feeling any more than we can see our own face: it is not
invisible, but we happen always to be looking the other way.
As in a ghost story, I leave my past selves all along the road,
and when I like I can turn and see them. Nevertheless, I
cannot see what they saw, nor can I feel what their attitudes
felt like, except by getting into them again. This is a per-
fectly possible proceeding, but it is a revival or recall of past
process and not an apprehension of it. Between repetition
and apprehension I have to choose.
NOTE.—Our relation to the feelings of others will obviously
come under the preceding account. I may share them in
genuine sympathy: or I may play at sharing them, in im-
aginative EmfUhlung: or I may apprehend them in that in
thought I perceive what they are. That is, they may supply
me both with primary or imaged feelings, and with objective
contents of knowledge.
The investigation contained in this essay was occasioned
by the study of Prof. Alexander's most suggestive and
provocative paper on ' Mental Activity in Willing and in
Ideas \1 I have come to agree with a good deal of its
doctrine, but with one passage I am bound to disagree even
more completely than I did at first reading of it. i t appears
lProc. Arift. Soc., 1908-1909.
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532 HELEN WODEHOUSE: THE APPREHE^.SION OF FEELING.
on page 27 of the paper: "To me, I myself cannot be a
cognitum, I can only be a cognitum to a being who stood
outside both me and physical things, in the same way as
I myself stand outside physical things and life. Life is
an individual thing to the liver. Bat I can contemplate
another being's life though I cannot live it. Now it is as
impossible for me to contemplate my own mind as for an
animal to live another animal's life. There is no reason,
however, in the nature of things why a race of beings should
not arise or be now in existence who can contemplate minds.
Such beings would be of a higher order of mind and for them
minds would be objects of knowledge."
I hope it is clear from the foregoing pages what my com-
ment on this would be.
(1) I can and do contemplate my own mind as I contemplate
physical things, and life, and anything else that I like in the
universe. Prof. Alexander proves it by writing papers about
his mind.
(2) But to contemplate is not the same as to live through.
My contemplation of an animal's life is a qualitatively dif-
ferent experience from the animal's, and my contemplation
of my own life is a different experience from the living of it;
hence I can only contemplate the part which I am not en-
gaged in living.
(3) As for the higher race of beings, they will have the
advantage of being able to contemplate any part of my life
they choose, since they are not engaged in living any of i t ;
and they will presumably have the disadvantage of a much
more limited access to what they want to know. So far
they are in the same position as my next-door neighbour.
If they are able by some means to share my feelings and
thoughts, they may overcome the limit of access by living
my life as well as contemplating i t They will then be in
the same position as myself. Of course if they are cleverer
than myself they will be able to do much more with that
position. And if they can " enter into " my beliefs and feel-
ings without being actually possessed by them, as I do fitfully
with my past self and with other people, they will keep a
calm and detachment of mind which will enable them to un-
derstand me much better than I understand myself. But I
cannot imagine any other way than this. They can con-
template heaven and earth and myself and themselves, and
so can I. And for all of us " seeing life " is a different thing
from living it.
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